This Article does not attempt to evaluate originalism as such. Instead, it scrutinizes originalism's specific practice in one doctrinal area, by three practitioners who matter: Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas. This Article shows that their specific "originalist" interpretations of the Establishment Clause are remarkably indifferent to the original purposes of that clause. This is not necessarily a criticism of originalism per se. However, the abuse of originalist scholarship that these judges have practiced raises questions about what originalist scholars are actually accomplishing.
Begin with some familiar puzzles of Establishment Clause interpretation. What does the clause have to say about Ten Commandments displays in schools or courthouses? About curricula that include "creation science"? About school prayer?
The proper originalist way to undertake these inquiries would be to look at the ideas of the Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution to discern why establishment of religion was regarded as a bad thing and what principle condemned it. The interpreter would then try to figure out how that principle applied to the case being decided.
I would have thought that the preceding paragraph was uncontroversial. 3 Remarkably, however, there has been an effort to expel such principled considerations from the interpretation of the clause. It has been conducted by the self-styled "originalists" on the Supreme Court-Justices Scalia and Thomas-and, before them, the late Chief Justice Rehnquist. Their arguments are a remarkable congeries of historical error and outright misrepresentation. There is a serious originalist inquiry to be done into the meaning of the Establishment Clause, but none of the "originalist" judges on the Court appear to have the slightest interest in undertaking that inquiry.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas have each followed very different strategies in their efforts to unmoor the clause from its original purposes. Their efforts have, however, had two characteristics in common: they rest on dreadful historical scholarship, and they conveniently coincide with the agenda of the Republican party.
I. THE VARIETIES OF PHONY ORIGINALISM
The most remarkable thing about the "originalist" interpretation of the Establishment Clause is the consistency of its conclusions. The historical evidence that purports to be the basis for the interpretation is mercurial; it changes from one Justice to the next while the bottom line remains the same. This is not surprising. As others have noted, the "originalist" Jus-3 tices are only opportunistically originalist. 4 When original meaning does not support the result they want to reach, they tend to ignore it, making it difficult to take their professions of originalism seriously. 5 Here, though, I set that aside and consider their "originalist" interpretations of the Establishment Clause on the merits. I begin by noting the political context in which they arise. I then examine their arguments.
A. Originalism, Orthodoxy, and the Republican Party
The fundamental claim upon which most of the self-styled "originalists" converge is that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit government from endorsing religion generally, so long as it does not discriminate among religions. (It later became clear that this meant that government could endorse theism, and perhaps more specific theological claims if these were shared by the major monotheistic religions.) The claim was stated succinctly by Attorney General Edwin Meese III, in his famous 1985 ABA speech calling for "a jurisprudence of original intention." 6 Meese claimed that the original intention was solely to prohibit Congress from establishing a national church. The belief was that the Constitution should not allow Congress to designate a particular faith or sect as politically above the rest. But to argue, as is popular today, that the Amendment demands strict neutrality between religion and irreligion would have struck the founding generation as bizarre. The purpose was to prohibit religious tyranny, not to undermine religion generally. 969-71 (1999) (arguing that, in cases involving takings, free exercise, standing, and affirmative action, "Justice Scalia departs radically from his chosen theory when it suits his fancy"); Eric J. Segall, A Century Lost: The End of the Originalism Debate, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 411, 427-28 (1998) (noting that Justice Scalia's "votes to overturn flag burning laws, hate speech laws, and affirmative action programs cannot be reconciled with a strictly originalist approach to constitutional interpretation"). Thanks to Thomas Colby for directing me to most of these citations. 5 The disingenuousness is particularly striking in 10 It is worth pausing to note just how politically convenient the claim was.
Something unusual in American history happened to religion in the 1970s, just before Meese and the other Reagan men took political power. The character of American religious divisions shifted. The divide between Protestants, Catholics, and Jews, once so important, had lost its salience. New controversies arose over abortion, gay rights, funding for the arts, child care policy, the roles of the sexes, and the place of traditional values in education, especially in sex education. The common thread in these debates, James Davison Hunter observes, is the cleavage between orthodox and progressive worldviews. Orthodoxy is characterized by its adherents' commitment to an external, definable, and transcendent authority. Progressivism, on the other hand, tends to take human well-being as the ultimate standard by which moral judgments and policy decisions are grounded, and to treat any moral truth as a human construction that is always subject to reevaluation in light of experience.
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In these new controversies, conservative Christians and Jews frequently joined together against progressives of both faiths. It became reasonable to hope that the Republicans could capture the Jewish vote for the first time since the 1920s.
12 (Compare the bitterly controversial Presidential candidacy of Catholic John F. Kennedy in 1960 with the non-issue of Jewish, but clearly orthodox in Hunter's sense, Vice-Presidential candidate Joseph Lieberman in 2000.) The traditionalists became an important constituency of the Republican party.
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While they differed over many things, they could agree on the importance of authority, notably symbolized by the invocation of God. What could be more congenial to this coalition than a constitutional rule that equated the views of the traditionalists with national identity, while holding that those most distant from the traditioanlists' revered authority were not full members of the political community?
B. Rehnquist
The rule proposed by Meese had been declared a month earlier in a dissenting opinion by then-Justice William Rehnquist, relying on very recent scholarly claims by Robert Cord:
The Framers intended the Establishment Clause to prohibit the designation of any church as a "national" one. The Clause was also designed to stop the Federal Government from asserting a preference for one religious denomination or sect over others. Given the "incorporation" of the Establishment Clause as against the States via the Fourteenth Amendment in Everson, States are prohibited as well from establishing a religion or discriminating between sects. As its history abundantly shows, however, nothing in the Establishment Clause requires government to be strictly neutral between religion and irreligion, nor does that Clause prohibit Congress or the States from pursuing legitimate secular ends through nondiscriminatory sectarian means. On this basis, Justice Rehnquist would have permitted a "generalized 'endorsement' of prayer."
15 Justice Thomas followed this line for a time, finding "much to commend" in "the view that the Framers saw the Establishment Clause simply as a prohibition on governmental preferences for some religious faiths over others." 16 Subsequent historical scholarship showed, however, that the nonpreferentialist interpretation of the First Amendment was mistaken. The First Congress considered and rejected at least four drafts of the amendment that explicitly would have adopted the nonpreferentialist view. Nor does the admittedly sparse legislative history offer much support for the position. No state offered nonpreferential aid to churches. Such aid was only seriously proposed in Maryland and Virginia, where it was rejected after much public debate in 1785 and 1786. Aid to more than one church was offered in some New England states, but those systems were in practice preferential and produced bitter division. There were also a variety of practices that endorsed and supported a generalized Protestantism, but these were uncontroversial in a uniformly Protestant country, and no one appears to have given much thought to their constitutional status. And, of course, state preference for Protestantism is not nonpreferentialism.
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In 1992, Michael McConnell observed that Chief Justice Rehnquist "has not mentioned" his nonpreferentialism theory since he wrote his opinion in Wallace in 1985, and that he "may have abandoned it."
18 Rehnquist never retracted his view, but to his credit, he became quiet about it when it became clear that it was wrong. On the other hand, he did not change his position, but joined opinions by Scalia that proposed the same interpretation of the Establishment Clause on a different basis.
propose to revolutionize the law on the basis of scholarship purporting to reveal the Constitution's original meaning, it would be prudent for them to wait a while to see how the scholarship is received. Cord's book was subjected to devastating critique within a few years of its publication. See infra note 17. 15 There is disagreement about how strong the argument was when Rehnquist made it. McConnell claims that Rehnquist relied on "seemingly powerful evidence of the original understanding," which was refuted by "more complete historical research." Id at 146. Laycock, on the other hand, writes that "[t]he prominence and longevity of the nonpreferential aid theory is remarkable in light of the weak evidence supporting it and the quite strong evidence against it." Laycock, supra note 17, at 877.
C. Scalia
The nonpreferentialist theme was picked up intact by Justice Scalia in 1987 in Edwards v. Aguillard, a case involving the teaching of "creation science" in the public schools. 19 He proposed that the Court abandon the requirement that a law have a secular purpose. Scalia is the Court's most strident originalist, 20 but in Edwards, unlike Rehnquist in Wallace, he offered no evidence of original intent at all. Instead, he proposed to modify the rule, like a good common law judge, because it was allegedly unworkable. 21 Five years later, however, in Lee v. Weisman, he became an originalist again. He proposed to uphold a prayer at a public school graduation entirely on the basis of history:
Justice Holmes' aphorism that "a page of history is worth a volume of logic" applies with particular force to our Establishment Clause jurisprudence. As we have recognized, our interpretation of the Establishment Clause should "compor The history and tradition of our Nation are replete with public ceremonies featuring prayers of thanksgiving and petition.
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The "originalism" here is of a very limited kind. No theory of the Establishment Clause follows from Scalia's premise. History is a purely negative source. As Kyle Duncan has written, " [t] This formulation offers many puzzles. First, Scalia does not cite a single historical source endorsing it. He shows that historical practice is consistent with it, but that is hardly the same thing as showing that anyone thought that it was a constitutional requirement.
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In fact, the common ground at the time of the Framing was not theism, but Protestantism.
26 Second, it is not clear how this rule follows from any of the purposes of the Establishment Clause. Scalia says nothing about those purposes. One reads his opinions in vain for any account of what the point was of having an Establishment Clause in the first place.
More recently, in McCreary County v. ACLU, 27 dissenting from a decision barring one ceremonial display of the Ten Commandments, Scalia frankly acknowledged that ceremonial theism would entail "contradicting the beliefs of some people that there are many gods, or that God or the gods pay no attention to human affairs." 28 The Commandments "are assuredly a religious symbol, but they are not so closely associated with a single religious belief that their display can reasonably be understood as preferring one religious sect over another. The Ten Commandments are recognized by Judaism, Christianity, and Islam alike as divinely given." 29 Justice Stevens objected that " [t] here are many distinctive versions of the Decalogue, ascribed to by different religions and even different denominations within a particular faith; to a pious and learned observer, these differences may be of Justice Scalia thus envisions a role for the Court in which it decides which articles of faith are sufficiently widely shared to be eligible for state endorsement (and in which determinedly uneducable judicial ignorance is a source of law!). Evidently, the state may endorse any religious proposition so long as that proposition is-or is believed by a judge unacquainted with doctrinal niceties to be-a matter of agreement between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. It would, for instance, be permissible for the state to declare that Gabriel is one of the most important archangels. The interpretation of the Establishment Clause would then depend on the further development of the Moslem idea of the People of the Book-those who have received a revelation that is deemed, formerly by the Koran, now by the Supreme Court-to be reliably from God. The originalist credentials of that particular idea are pretty bad. The United States at the time of the Framing was quite hostile to Moslem theology. Thomas Colby has argued that Scalia has adopted the astounding position that the Establishment Clause itself discriminates among religions: state endorsement of polytheism or atheism would violate the clause, but state endorsement of biblical monotheism does not. 39 Kyle Duncan has responded that Scalia is using generalized monotheism as a baseline for what is constitutionally permitted but is not committed to invalidating other endorsements of religious belief that are not monotheistic. Scalia's traditionalism, Duncan observes, is "a 'one-way ratchet'-that is, a method that tends to use tradition negatively (to say what practices ambiguous constitutional guarantees do not restrain) and not positively (to say what practices ambiguous constitutional guarantees forbid)." 40 This "one-way ratchet" approach relies on no theory of the meaning or purpose of the Establishment Clause. Scalia's claim is that whatever the Establishment Clause means, it cannot apply to a practice of which the Framers knew and approved. The argument is essentially, "I have no idea preferentialist "would still need to explain why the government's preference for theistic religion is constitutional"). 36 There are several difficulties with "I Have No Idea Originalism." One is that it produces results that modern interpreters are likely to be uncomfortable with. A structurally identical argument was made on behalf of laws mandating segregated schools, or prohibiting interracial marriage: the Framers knew and approved of such laws, therefore the Fourteenth Amendment, whatever it means, cannot prohibit that. 44 The same argument might be made to show that the Free Speech Clause permits a law criminalizing criticism of incumbent officeholders. Congress enacted just such a law, less than a decade after the First Amendment was adopted, in the Sedition Act of 1798, which made it a crime to write about Congress or the 41 It does not appear in the otherwise very useful taxonomy of originalisms in Colby and Smith. See
Colby & Smith, supra note 2, pt. I. On the other hand, the basic methodological move, and its fundamental lack of principle, are noted in Thomas President "with intent to defame" or "to excite against them . . . the hatred of the good people of the United States."
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The deeper problem is that "I Have No Idea Originalism" does not even try to interpret the Constitution. It does not attempt to state the principle for which the disputed constitutional provision stands. Scalia might argue that original practice cannot determine the meaning of these clauses, but it can eliminate some proposed interpretations, those inconsistent with the original practices. As we have just seen, however, the procedure for eliminating even those interpretations is question-begging. The fact that someone in the Founding generation did something does not prove that it was constitutionally permissible even then. You have to say what the clause means before you can tell whether it has been violated. 46 The defenders of the miscegenation laws did better than Scalia in this respect. In the 1883 case of Pace v. Alabama, 47 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of miscegenation laws. The statute in question in Pace prescribed penalties for interracial sex that were more severe than those imposed for adultery or fornication between persons of the same race. The Court unanimously rejected the equal protection challenge to the statute, denying that the statute discriminated on the basis of race:
[The section prohibiting interracial sex] prescribes a punishment for an offence which can only be committed where the two sexes are of different races. There is in neither section any discrimination against either race. . . . Whatever discrimination is made in the punishment prescribed in the two sections is directed against the offence designated and not against the person of any particular color or race. The punishment of each offending person, whether white or black, is the same.
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The Pace Court did not embrace "I Have No Idea Originalism." It had a principle upon which it relied: the Equal Protection Clause prohibits laws that treat the races differently. Miscegenation laws, the Court held, do not violate that principle.
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The trouble with the Pace Court's reasoning, of course, is that it is entirely decoupled from the underlying purposes of the Equal Protection Clause. 45 The Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798). 46 The later Plessy v. Ferguson decision, upholding racial segregation statutes (relying in part on the authority of Pace), at least concedes that it would cut against a law's constitutionality if it were true that the law "stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority." 50 Pace says nothing at all about why there is an Equal Protection Clause, though it implies that the concern is not with the subordination of groups, but with a certain kind of classification. (In this it resembles the present Court.) 51 It is, then, unsurprising that it was ultimately overruled when the Court noticed that miscegenation laws were "measures designed to maintain White Supremacy," 52 and that this purpose "violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause." 53 Jack Balkin observes that when the text of the Constitution proposes a vague principle, like equal protection or nonestablishment, that principle must be cashed out in terms of subsidiary or underlying principles. History can help determine what these principles are. Contemporaneous statements of principle, and the general problems that the provision sought to address, are both pertinent. "The principles underlying the text should be at roughly the same level of generality as the text (understood to include any generally recognized terms of art). If the text uses general language, the underlying principles that support and explain the text should as well." 54 This is because the Framers should be presumed to know what they are doing if they use very abstract language. "Absent strong evidence to the contrary, we assume that people choose general language if they want to endorse general principles, and more specific language if they want to commit themselves to narrower principles." 55 So with the Establishment Clause, our task is to discern the principle for which the provision stands. The proper originalist formulation is that of a Supreme Court Justice who never proclaimed himself an originalist, William Brennan, who wrote in 1963 that the Court should ask whether challenged practices "threaten those consequences which the Framers deeply feared; whether, in short, they tend to promote that type of interdependence between religion and state which the First Amendment was designed to 50 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896). "If this be so," the Court concluded, "it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it." Id. Charles Black observes that "the Plessy Court clearly conceived it to be its task to show that segregation did not really disadvantage the Negro, except through his own choice." Charles L. tion that, because the clause is not an individual rights provision, it is not incorporable into the Fourteenth Amendment. 62 However, he ignores Amar's claim that religious classifications may violate equal protection:
As strange as it sounds, an incorporated Establishment Clause prohibits exactly what the Establishment Clause protected-state practices that pertain to "an establishment of religion." At the very least, the burden of persuasion rests with anyone who claims that the term took on a different meaning upon incorporation. 63 He suggests that the Court's 1962 and 1963 cases invalidating classroom prayer and Bible reading were wrongly decided. 64 He invites litigants to bring about a revolution in Establishment Clause law: "I would welcome the opportunity to consider more fully the difficult questions whether and how the Establishment Clause applies against the States." 65 Thomas is following a respectable line of scholarship. This scholarship argues that the Establishment Clause did not enact any principle of religious freedom at all, but merely enacted a jurisdictional boundary between the states and the federal government, whereby the federal government had no power either to establish a religion or to eliminate state establishments. This claim has been extensively debated, 66 and it is a possible reading of the textual language, although no Framer ever expressly endorsed it. 67 Even if one accepts the claim, however, it does not mean that the Court was mistaken in finding that a nonestablishment principle is binding on the states in Everson and its progeny. The pertinent intention is not that of the Framers of the First Amendment, but the Framers of the Fourteenth, which is the source of any constraint that is now imposed on the states. This is the familiar problem of incorporation of the Bill of Rights. 68 stood to be a liberty as fully capable of incorporation as any other provision in the first eight amendments to the Constitution." 69 Perhaps Thomas has an answer to the difficulty raised by Lash's scholarship. It is impossible to tell. Thomas ignores Lash and pretends that his work does not exist. Instead, he selectively cites the findings of originalist scholarship that support the result he is inclined to reach-sweeping contrary evidence under the rug-while claiming that he is merely following the intentions of the Framers. Smith overlooks a third possibility: that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment understood themselves to be embodying just the kind of ideal of nonestablishment that had animated Madison, and that they were trying to constrain the states, and thus to avoid the evils of alienation and corruption, in just the same way that the original Establishment Clause constrained the federal government. If this is correct-here it can only be a suggestion-then the Court has been right to rely on the thought of Madison, who gave religion far more sustained attention than the Framers of 1868, to work out the meaning of nonestablishment.
More recently, Smith has been more generous to the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment could be a basis for a broad conception of Establishment Clause constraints on the states. Smith, supra note 66.
70 In fairness to Justice Thomas, a Westlaw "citing references" search of sources citing Lash's article finds that it has only been mentioned in two Supreme Court briefs, and neither addressed the core question of whether the Establishment Clause is jurisdictional. One tried to show that state establishments were no longer protected from federal scrutiny. On the other hand, it is reasonable to expect Thomas, before proposing a constitutional revolution, to do his basic homework and to familiarize himself with the historical scholarship. He might have begun by more carefully reading Amar's book, on which he placed such reliance, since Amar includes a discussion of Lash's precise findings, although not in the passages Thomas cites. AMAR, supra note 62, at 254-56. The Supreme Court has excellent librarians. Had Justice Thomas asked one of them to find the evidence, he would have gotten Lash's article immediately.
Thomas has also attributed to the Framers a different view: that a violation of the Establishment Clause requires legal coercion. 71 His method is essentially the same as Scalia's: he shows that the Framers' behavior was consistent with such a rule. He offers no evidence that any Framer endorsed, or even thought of, that rule. He calls the rule he has invented "the original meaning of the Clause." The role of original meaning is contested in constitutional law. But it is generally agreed that, when a provision is aimed at a specific historical evil, the provision should be read as preventing a recurrence of that evil or others relevantly like it. Of course, there is room for disagreement as to what counts as other evils relevantly like it. When a situation not absolutely identical to that original evil arises, we must decide whether it is relevantly like it. In such a situation, the original meaning won't help us. The prohibition rarely arrives with a rule for its interpretation, and often the Framers had no specific interpretive rule in mind. 73 When the authors of the First Amendment condemned establishment, Thomas Curry noted, "they had in their minds an image of tyranny, not a definition of a system."
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A. The Paradigm Case Method
Jed Rubenfeld has observed that constitutional interpretation is frequently guided by paradigm cases, which are specific core commitments that are memorialized by the constitutional provisions. An example is the Fourteenth Amendment. The amendment's language is broad, but it was enacted specifically in order to outlaw the Black Codes-laws enacted by white-controlled legislatures after the Civil War that imposed specific legal disabilities on blacks, such as requiring them to be gainfully employed under contracts of long duration, excluding them from occupations other than manual labor, and disabling them from testifying against whites in court. Any plausible interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment must invalidate the Black Codes. More broadly, any interpretation that specifies the more general types of inequality that the amendment forbids must be a chain of inferences from the core commitment represented by the paradigm case.
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It is hard to imagine how an originalist could avoid using the paradigm case method in some form, at least in interpreting those constitutional provisions that are aimed at specific evils. For example, the Fourth Amendment's ban on unreasonable searches and seizures should be read in light of the controversies over general searches and writs of assistance before the American Revolution. 77 The Contract Clause should be read as a response to debtor relief legislation in the 1780s. 78 If original meaning is to count at all, then a constitutional provision must be understood to address the very problem that it was designed to remedy.
Unless it states a specific rule, a constitutional provision must also be understood to stand for some principle. That principle must address the very problem that the provision was designed to solve. The principle, however, cannot simply be a rule that addresses that problem and nothing more. If the Framers had intended to address only a specific problem, they could have said so.
B. The Right Establishment Clause Questions to Ask
The Establishment Clause is a particularly apt candidate for paradigm case interpretation because the core historical wrong that it is intended to bar-an establishment of religion of the kind that existed in England-is specifically named in the text.
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Paradigm case reasoning proceeds by "extrapolating general principles from the foundational paradigm cases and applying those principles to the controversy at hand."
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With respect to provisions such as the First and Fourteenth Amendments, which prohibit certain government actions, the general principle should give a convincing account of the result in the paradigm case while at the same time properly specifying the kind of evil that the prohibition reaches. The principle should explain what kind of wrong the provision is prohibiting, so that in subsequent controversies it is possible to tell whether the same kind of wrong is or is not occurring. 76 In Establishment Clause cases, then, a good originalist judge should ask: (1) why did the Framers think establishment of religion is a bad thing; and (2) is the same bad thing brought about by the challenged action in this case? There will obviously be room for disagreement about both of these issues. The paradigm case method does not decide cases, but it makes clear which questions the judges should ask.
The problem is made more difficult by the need to discern the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 81 It is clear that the Framers meant to constrain state sponsorship of religion, but it is unclear how they intended to do this. To make matters more difficult, the meaning of nearly every provision of the Bill of Rights that has been incorporated has been held to be exactly the same with respect to the federal government and the states, despite prominent arguments that they ought to be treated differently. 82 Discerning the original meaning of nonestablishment is obviously far beyond the scope of this Article. It is enough here to show that it is a difficult task, and that the Court's "originalist" judges aren't even trying to do it. But something can be said about what is being ignored in their analysis.
C. Madison
The classic description of the pathologies that the Founding generation associated with establishment is James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments. 83 Madison was reticent about his own religious beliefs, which were probably some variant of Deism, 84 but the Memorial and Remonstrance is nonetheless the most useful source of antiestablishment thinking. It was a public document, not a private statement of Madison's views. It presented a synthesis of the anti-establishment views that prevailed in his time, combining religious arguments designed to appeal to Evangelical Christians and secular arguments designed to appeal to Enlightenment Lockeans. 85 It is unlikely that these groups agreed on anything more than the propositions stated by Madison The original meaning of nonestablishment cannot, of course, simply be read off the writings of Madison. Nonetheless, the Memorial and Remonstrance is the most important single datum on that meaning, and it shows us the concerns, prominent at the time of the Framing, that the so-called "originalists" ignore. 87 Madison objected to the establishment of religion, even the mild nonpreferentialist proposal that he was writing against, for many reasons, of which I will here cite only two. The first is a kind of political alienation. Establishment "degrades from the equal rank of Citizens all those whose opinions in Religion do not bend to those of the Legislative authority." 88 The second is the corruption of religion itself. Madison argued that the idea "that the Civil Magistrate is a competent Judge of Religious Truth" is "an arrogant pretension falsified by the contradictory opinions of Rulers in all ages." 89 Madison denounced the idea that religion should be promoted because it is conducive to good citizenship, an idea that we often hear today.
The state debates help show how the concept of establishment was understood in the Framers' generation. Learning how that generation understood the concept may be more informative than the brief and unfocused debate in the House [on the First Amendment. The Senate debate was not recorded]. If the Framers generally understood the concept in a certain way, and if nothing indicates that they used the word in an unusual sense in the first amendment, then we can fairly assume that the Framers used the word in accordance with their general understanding of the concept. * * * For several reasons, the debates in Virginia were most important. First, the arguments were developed most fully in Virginia. Second, Madison led the winning coalition, and he played a dominant role in the adoption of the establishment clause three years later. Third, the debates in Virginia may have been the best known. Laycock, supra note 17, at 895; accord SIDNEY E. MEAD, THE LIVELY EXPERIMENT: THE SHAPING OF CHRISTIANITY IN AMERICA 57 (1963) . 87 A much narrower reading of the paradigm case might be inferred from the research of Michael
He felt that this idea was an attempt to "employ Religion as an engine of Civil policy," which he thought "an unhallowed perversion of the means of salvation." 90 Moreover, experience witnesseth that ecclesiastical establishments, instead of maintaining the purity and efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary operation. During almost fifteen centuries, has the legal establishment of Christianity been on trial.
What have been its fruits? More or less in all places, pride and indolence in the Clergy; ignorance and servility in the laity; in both, superstition, bigotry and persecution.
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D. Madison v. Scalia Although this is not the place to defend the Court's interpretations of the Establishment Clause, 92 a cursory reading makes clear that the two concerns of political alienation and corruption of religion have animated much of the caselaw. The Court has understood its task to be to devise practical rules that would prevent these two evils. You may, of course, disagree with the Court. But the way to do that is to show that alienation and corruption are not, in fact, the consequences of the state activities that the Court has been inclined to invalidate under the Establishment Clause. 93 These considerations are particularly pertinent to Justice Scalia's interpretation of the Establishment Clause. The idea that religion might be degraded by state sponsorship is entirely lost on Scalia. The closest he comes to acknowledging the Madisonian concerns about alienation and corruption is one passage in which he deems it relevant that the major monotheistic religions-Christianity, Islam, and Judaism-"combined account for 97.7% of all believers." 94 But his numbers are wrong: in calculating the level of exclusion here, nonbelievers are doubly excluded, since they are not even entitled to be part of the denominator. If one adds the nonbelievers, as enumerated in the 2004 Statistical Abstract of the United States which Scalia cites, the excluded adult population is 33 million out of 207 million, or 16 percent.
The numbers are in fact a bit more complicated than the Statistical Abstract suggests. The proportion of Americans who report having no religious preference doubled in the 1990s, from 7 percent in 1991 (which had been its level for almost 20 years) to 14 percent in 1998. However, most of the members of this category are in fact religious. More than half believe in God, more than half believe in life after death, about a third believe in heaven and hell, and 93 percent sometimes pray. The most careful study of this group concludes that the newer members are mostly "unchurched believers" who declare no religious preference in an effort to express their distance from the religious right. 96 It is clear that these people are not interested in being part of the theistic triumphalism that Scalia wants to license. Similarly, Steven Gey observes that, in order to calculate the number of people excluded from Scalia's formula, one ought also to include the large number of theists who reject state sponsorship of religion, including "[t]raditional Roger Williamsstyle Baptists, Seventh-day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, most Jews, many Presbyterians, and other modern nonfundamentalist Protestants." 97 Scalia does not explain his indifference to these people while he conspicuously includes Jews (whether they want inclusion or not) and Moslems, who together comprise fewer than 4 million Americans.
III. DUPES AND FELLOW TRAVELERS
In short, the "originalism" that one now finds on the Supreme Court is a phony originalism which is opportunistically used to advance substantive positions that the judges find congenial. There are originalists who deserve to be taken seriously, but none of them are Supreme Court Justices. 99 The conclusions of this Article do not in any way impugn the work of originalist scholars who are conscientiously striving to determine the original meaning of the Constitution. It is the scholars, not the judges, whose 99 The wedge I have drawn here between professors and judges is generally correct, but it must unhappily be said that some "originalists," whom I will not name here, rushed to defend the Supreme Court's astonishing abuse of its power in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). One can easily imagine what they would have said had the Court engaged in such contortions on behalf of Democrats. The dishonesty or self-deception of the Bush v. Gore majority is perhaps understandable: by reaching the result they did, they got something tangible that they badly wanted, a Republican President. But what, exactly, do scholars gain by mortifying their intellects in this way? They are worse than political hacks. They are public relations flacks for political hacks.
